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1. Introduction
In this paper, I present a dynamic semantics of permission sentences
which analyzes the effects of deontic operators in discourse. Per-
mission statements are known to be problematic for logical and lin-
guistic theories based on standard systems of modal logic. These
systems lead to predictions that are contrary to what natural language
intuitions dictate. The tension between traditional modal deontic se-
mantics and the proper characterization of the meaning of permis-
sion statements involving the deontic expression may has surfaced
in the form of a number of so-called paradoxes or problems. The
most relevant ones in the philosophical literature are (i) the paradox
of free choice permisssion (Von Wright, 1969; Kamp, 1973) and (ii)
Lewis’(1979) problem about spurious permission. My proposal gives
a solution to these two problems and to the intrincacies of the mean-
ing of boolean connectives in statements of this sort.
2. Free Choice Sentences
Consider the following sentences:
(1) a. You may eat a banana or a pear
b. You may eat a banana
(2) a. You may go to San Francisco or stay in L.A.
b. You may go to San Francisco
Sentences (1a) and (2a) are “free choice” permission state-
ments. If the speaker utters (1a), he is giving the addressee permis-
sion to eat either a banana or a pear. In other words, the addressee
is free to choose from the options presented from the speaker: eat a
banana, eat a pear or both. Therefore, when the speaker gives per-
mission to the addressee to eat a banana or a pear, he is giving him
permission to eat a banana. Our intuitions are, then, that (1a) en-
tails (1b) and (2a) entails (2b). Nevertheless, this represents a prob-
lem for standard systems of deontic logic, as noticed by Ross (1941),
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Von Wright (1969) and Kamp (1973,1979). In these systems, the en-
tailment pattern that can be straigthforwardly derived is exactly the
opposite, as the following proof shows:
(3) P P( )
Proof: P( ) Assumption
P( ) P( ) intro.
P( ) Modal theorem
P( ) P( )
Kamp (1973, 1979) found the accounts presented to date not
satisfactory and proposed a solution in the spirit of Lewis’ (1979) pro-
posal. The solution consisted essentially in spelling out the semantics
of commands and permission statements using some concepts that in
a certain respect anticipate the dynamic view of meaning. A com-
mand, according to Kamp and Lewis, restricts the options for action
of the addressee. A permission statement broadens the options for
action of the addressee. The options for action of an agent at time
and world are formally defined as the possible continuations of
after in which the agent fulfills all his obligations and forbears
doing the things from which he is prohibited.
Let denote the set of possible continuations
of after in which the agent B fulfills his obligations and does
not transgress anything he is prohibited from doing. Suppose that
A utters in at the sentence Clean my table! and that B is the
addressee of A’s utterance. Let S be the set of worlds in which B
cleans A’s table. Then, the effect of A’s command is to restrict the set
of permitted continuations for B in at to those in which B cleans
A’s table:
(4)
A permission has the opposite effect in the set of permitted
options for action of a given agent. If a speaker A tells B You may
and S’ is the set of worlds in which holds, then the effect of A’s
utterance is to enlarge the set of permitted options for B with S’:
(5)
In order to handle the entailment relation between (1a) and
(1b) or (2a) and (2b), Kamp (1973) introduces a new notion of entail-
ment, P(ermission)-entailment, defined as follows:
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(6) P-entails iff in every situation the set of worlds added
to the options of the addressee through the use of includes
the set of worlds added to the set of options through the use
of
Kamp (1979) abandons this solution because he considered
it problematic with respect to Lewis’ spurious permisssion problem,
which we will discuss below. In a nutshell, the above definition of en-
tailment predicts that when an agent is granting the permission stated
in (7a) he is also granting (7b)—(7a) P-entails (7b).
(7) a. You may go to San Francisco
b. You may go to San Francisco and burn my house
His new solution is to propose that the meaning of You may
or is computed by calculating separately first the option space
granted by You may and the option space granted by You may ,
and combining the two of them by set-theoretic union. Then, writing
to denote the set of worlds added to the options of the
addressee in through the utterance of , the following holds:
(8) You may or =
You may You may
This resolves the entailment problem but, as pointed out by
Rohrbaugh (1995), it predicts the equivalence of (9a) and (9b):
(9) a. I permit you to eat an apple or a pear
b. I permit you to eat an apple or I permit you to eat a pear
The above sentences are not equivalent, nor are the follow-
ing ones, illustrating the fact that VP-level disjunction does not have
the same effect in permission sentences as sentence level (or speech-
act level) disjunction does.
(10) a. You may go to San Francisco or stay in L.A.
b. You may go to San Francisco or you may stay in L.A.
3. Strong and Weak Readings
Kamp (1979) also noticed that the sentence in (1a), repeated here as
(11a), is ambiguous between two readings: a strong reading and a
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weak reading. In its “strong” or most salient reading it constitutes
a free choice permission statement and entails (11b). In the “weak
reading”, (11a) simply states the speaker’s ignorance about which
disjunct is actually permitted. Then, (11b) entails (11a).
(11) a. You may eat a banana or a pear
b. You may eat a banana
3.1. Properties of the Strong Reading
The strong reading of a permisssion sentence makes it a free choice
permission statement: the speaker is granting permission to the ad-
dresse (12a) or telling the addressee that he is granting permission to
a third person/s (12b):
(12) a. You may go to San Francisco or stay in L.A.
b. John may go to San Francisco or stay in L.A.
The strong reading of a permission statement may be para-
phrased by a performative sentence:
(13) I hereby permit you to go to San Francisco or stay in L.A
(14) John may buy an Opel or a Honda =
I hereby permit John to buy an Opel or a Honda
Third, as was discussed previously, the following holds:
P( ) P( ). The opposite direction does not hold: P( )
P( ). Also, in the strong reading the equivalence in (15) holds.
(15) P( ) P( ) P( )
The following example illustrates the above equivalence. If
the speaker is giving permission to John to buy an Opel or a Honda
uttering (16a), then the permission granted is the same as the permis-
sion granted by (16b).
(16) a. John may buy an Opel or a Honda
b. John may buy an Opel and John may buy a Honda
There is a variety of the strong reading in which the dis-
junction connective is construed as exclusive or. For instance, in the
following discourse, the parent is most likely granting permission to
buy a car or take a vacation but not both.
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(17) As a gift for your graduation, you may buy this expensive
car or take the trip to the Bahamas that you wanted so much
3.2. Properties of the Weak Reading
A permission statement in its weak reading is a free choice permis-
sion report: it simply states the speaker’s ignorance about which dis-
junct is actually permitted.
(18) John may buy an Opel or a Honda =
John has been granted permission to buy an Opel or a Honda
(but I don’t know which one)
In the weak reading of the above sentence, the speaker is re-
porting to the addressee that a third person has granted John permis-
sion to buy an Opel or a Honda. Consequently, permission statements
in their weak reading may not be paraphrased by a performative sen-
tence.
In comparison to the strong reading, it can be observed that
the reverse entailment patterns arise: P( ) P( ) does not hold,
but P( ) P( ) holds. Another entailment pattern of interest is
the following one, illustrated in (19): P( ) P( ) P( )
(19) a. John may buy an Opel or John may buy a Honda
b. John may buy an Opel or a Honda
The weak reading of a permission sentence is a combina-
tion of a deontic and an epistemic statement. It cannot be considered
a pure epistemic sentence. In other words, there is a subtle difference
between the “permission report” reading and a pure epistemic read-
ing. For instance, sentence (19a) in its epistemic readingmeans that it
is possible that John buy a Opel or a Honda—perhaps because he has
not decided yet about which one, or the speaker does not know the
content of his decision, or John is hoping to get a loan to finance the
car, etc. These are all circumstances that make the epistemic reading
true. The permission report reading requires something different and
much more specific, namely that the speaker is reporting the effect of
a deontic permission statement.
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4. Actions in Dynamic Semantics
The essence of the dynamic conception of semantics is to consider the
basic meaning of a sentence to be not its truth-conditional content but
its context-change potential. The meaning of an arbitrary expression
in a state is the change that it brings about to s. Let us assume
that a conversation is in a discourse state . Then, after processing a
formula , the discourse moves to a state , as depicted in (20). The
state is like except in those aspects that are not compatible with
what expresses. Using a postfix notation, we write for the
meaning of the formula in a state , as in (21).
(20)
(21) = iff and S
Different branches of dynamic semantics vary with respect
to what they consider to be an information state. In DPL (Groe-
nendijk and Stokhof, 1991) andDMG (Groenendijk and Stokhof,1990)
a state is a set of assignments of values to variables. In DRT, a state
corresponds to a Discourse Representation Structure K, such that K
is the DRS built after processing a discourse (a finite sequence of sen-
tences). In Dynamic Modal Logic a state is a set of worlds. This is
the conception of a state that we will be adopting here. Furthermore,
states will be epistemically construed, ie., we will be talking about
the knowledge state of an agent rather than of a discourse state or a
conversation state. This point is important in the type of account that
we will be developing.
Dynamic action semantics adds to standard dynamic seman-
tics a more refined analysis of action expressions. This analysis, I
claim, is needed in order to give a correct account of the seman-
tics of permission sentences. I present an extension of current dy-
namic modal frameworks (Veltman, 1996; Groenendijk, Stokhof and
Veltman, 1995; Van Eijck and Cepparello, 1995) that incorporates
a dynamic semantics for actions (DAS), along the lines proposed in
Pratt’s (1978) process semantics, Van der Meyden’s (1996) logic of
permission and Hamblin’s (1987) analysis of imperatives. An action
expression is conceived of as denoting a program, ie. a set of se-
quences of states. Consider the action expression = Brutus killed
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Caesar. 1 Let us assume that the expression denotes in a model
and state a set with three members. Each sequence represents an
execution of the action (Israel, Perry and Tutiya, 1993), i.e., the way
of performing the action that results in that sequence of states.
(22) =
So, in the denotation of above, each sequence represents
a different execution of Brutus’ action of killing Caesar in . In
one execution he stabs Caesar three times, in another he stabs Cae-
sar thirty times, and in the third one he stabs him fifteen times. An
execution of an action is a transition between states. The minimal re-
quirement that all the sequences in the denotation of have to satisfy
is that in the initial state of the sequence Caesar is not dead, and in
the final one he is.
(23) s ss s
s s
A model for the language of DAS is a tuple =
. W is a set of worlds and W = , where is a set of finitely
many atomic sentences. This gives us the desired epistemic interpre-
tation of worlds. A world is a set of facts—atomic sentences—in the
knowledge base of an agent (Veltman, 1996). is the set
of states, so a state is a set of possible worlds. The knowledge state
of an agent is, then, a family of sets of facts, i.e., those that constitute
possible epistemic alternatives. Information growth is represented as
elimination of some of those possibilities.
is a relation between states, , where
iff the transition from state to state represents a permitted state
transition. Then, we say that a sequence of states
is permitted, , iff every state transition in the sequence is
in P. So, for instance, assume that =
and in the proposition that John ma-
nipulated his sales report is true. Then, assuming that we are dealing
with agents with standard ethical criteria, the first execution of the ac-
tion is not permitted since it contains a state transition
1A perhaps more intuitive alternative would be to consider kill Caesar as an action
expression and relativize it to agents. Here we stick to the simpler option.
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which is not permitted. This corresponds to the intuition that an ex-
ecution of the action of getting a pay raise involving a manipulation
of sales reports is not permitted, even if the rest of the transitions that
bring about the completion of the action are permitted.
The function A is the interpretation function
for atomic action expressions A, i.e., is the set of sequences
of states denoted by . Finally, the function V maps atomic proposi-
tional symbols to the set of worlds where the proposition holds.








Let us explain the clauses of the definition in more detail.
An expression denotes in a state the set of those worlds in in
which holds. Similarly, denotes in s the subset of s constituted
by the worlds in which does not hold. Another way of expressing
it is: . The denotation of the ex-
pression is computed by updating first the state with and,
as a result, eliminating from the worlds that are not in . Then,
the resulting state is updated with , yielding a final state in which
the worlds that are not in and the worlds that are not in
are eliminated. The interpretation of dynamic disjunction has an ex-
clusive flavour built in. Updating with restricts to the set
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of worlds that are either in or are not in but are in .
The dynamic content of an action expression in a state is the set
of sequences of states in the denotation of , , such that the
first coordinate of is . Obviously, this represents the “atemporal”
value of actions, and it suffices for our purposes. The effect of the
past and future operators would be captured as follows—where
is an ordering relation between states: 2
The clauses defining operations on actions are straightfor-
ward. The formula may be read as “if then ” or, perhaps
more properly, “after , ”. The effect of the modal operators and
amounts to existential and universal quantification over sequences
of states in the denotation of an action. so, for any action and state
, is supported by iff there is a permitted sequence in the de-
notation of or, in other words, if some execution of is permitted.
Conversely, supports iff all executions of are permitted.
In the above paragraph we have introduced an informal no-
tion of support. A more precise definition of this notion, and of the
derived notions of entailment and equivalence between formulas, is
as follows:
(24) Support/Acceptance: s iff = s
Entailment: iff
Equivalence: iff &
5. Explaining the Strong/Weak Contrast
The strong and weak readings of permission sentences are repre-
sented by the presence of the strong ( ) or weak ( ) permission op-
erator respectively. The strong operator models free choice, whereas
the weak operator models partial ignorance about permission. Recall
that, following Veltman(1996), we are conceiving of worlds as sets
of atomic propositions in the knowledge state of an agent. Then,
the update of with adds the information that all the executions
of are permitted. Consider one of our favourite examples:
2For any states , in a sequence , iff i(s) & j(s’) & i j.
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(25) You may take a banana or an apple
The strong reading of (25) states that any course of action in
which the addressee takes a banana or an apple and such that it does
not violate what the speaker considers permissible is permitted. This
is precisely represented as follows:
(26) =
=




Fact 1 captures in a straightforward way the entailment pat-
tern of strong readings, whereas fact 2 derives the equivalence pointed
out in (15). The reading of (17) and (27) with exclusive or requires
an additional binary operation on actions ( ):
=
(27) You may buy a Porsche or a Corvette
Then, we prove again a fact that derives the equivalence be-
tween the exclusive reading of (27) and sentence (28):
Fact 3:
(28) You may buy a Porsche or you may buy a Corvette
Let us now consider the weak reading of permission sen-
tences. A knowledge state supports iff an execution of is
considered permitted in . If a speaker utters (29), then he is as-
serting that there is a course of action in which the addressee takes
a banana or an apple such that it does not violate what the speaker
considers permissible (30).





Facts 4 and 5 are again immediately derived applying the
definitions, and predict the properties explained in section 3.2 above.
Fact 4:
Fact 5:
Lewis’ (1979) problem about permission does not arise in
DAS, because permission sentences do not merely enlarge the option
set of the addressee. Only sequences of states consisting of permitted
transitions are in the denotation of the permission operators. There-
fore, from (31a) one cannot infer (31b) because presumably most of
the executions of the action burn my house are not permitted even if
the two conjuncts are true in the same worlds.
(31) a. You may go to San Francisco
b. You may go to San Francisco and burn my house
6. Extensions of the Analysis
Rohrbaugh (1995) observes that permission sentences are decreasing
in the internal argument of the verb: (32a) entails (32b).
(32) a. You may eat three apples
b. You may eat two apples
The decreasingness effect is predicted as a result of the pres-
ence of the permission operator and the execution-based sequence
semantics for actions. We say that an action is an extension of or
encompasses an action ( ) iff such
that is a subsequence of . Then, from the above definition and
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This captures the intended inference in (32), but would er-
roneously predict that in (33) below, the speaker is also granting per-
mission to write one essay, instead of taking the midterm. The spe-
cial reading of (33) we call a “package deal” reading. In other words,
the addressee is granted permission to perform an action in which he
writes two essays instead of taking the midterm. This effect blocks
the decrasingness property.
(33) Instead of taking the midterm you may write two essays
Another problem for some analysis of deontic sentences is
that they validate the inference from (34a) to (34b). Nevertheless,
this does not present any problem for the semantics that we are de-
veloping, because does not entail in DAS.
(34) a. If you commit a traffic violation, then you may appeal
it in court.
b. Youmay commit a traffic violation and appeal it in court.
When an imperative expression and a proposition are con-
nected by the connectives and/or, the second conjunct is interpreted
as a repercussion of the compliance (35a) or as a repercussion of the
failure to comply (35b) with the command in the first conjunct.
(35) a. Go to San Francisco and Jane will be happy
b. Go to San Francisco or Jane will be unhappy.




The above formulas have as their unique interpretation a
“repercussive” one. In other words, according to the update seman-
tics of , the proposition Jane will be happy is interpreted in the state
resulting from updating with the command Go to San Francisco.
Similarly, the semantic clause for yields either the set of worlds
in which the command is satisfied or the worlds resulting from inter-
preting the proposition Jane will be unhappy in a state in which the
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